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Introduction
Attorney Timothy Muir served as inside general counsel, and later
outside counsel, for Scott Tucker’s payday loan corporation and
affiliated businesses.1 Tucker’s payday loan enterprise, which held itself
†

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of
Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to Cassandra Burke Robertson and the
editors of the Case Western Law Review for the invitation to participate
in this Symposium. I also want to Tennessee law alumna Hayley Jensen
who first introduced me to Timothy Muir in the research paper that she
submitted for my Behavioral Legal Ethics class, titled: In-House Ethical
Dangers: The Perilous Interplay of Professional Duties & Client Loyalties
(on file with the author).

1.

James Dornbrook, Still Maintaining Innocence, Payday Lender Lawyer
Muir Faces Reckoning, K.C. Bus. J. (May 11, 2018, 5:01 AM),
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out as various businesses,2 charged customers illegal interest rates of
600 percent and higher.3 Loans were set up to automatically renew—a
fact that was misrepresented in the required Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) forms.4 The companies’ loan payment plans resulted in a $300
loan costing a consumer $975, though the TILA forms represented it
would cost $390.5
In an effort to escape prosecution and consumer class actions, Muir
and Tucker entered transactions with Indian tribes to create the
appearance that the tribes owned and operated the payday loan
business.6 The government described Muir as “the architect” of these
transactions.7 The goal was that the payday loan companies would
avoid liability because the tribes, as sovereigns, would not be subject
to state civil and criminal usury laws.8 In reality, the tribes would play
no actual ownership role; they were well-paid for entering the
“ownership” agreement and keeping a company computer on the
reservation.9 Tucker and Muir misrepresented the tribes’ interest in the
https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2018/05/11/paydaylender-tim-muir-prison-scott-tucker.html
[https://perma.cc/AW2EJEF4] (describing Muir’s role with the payday loan businesses as general
counsel for about six months and then outside counsel). The court
described Muir’s role as the company’s “general counsel since 2006.”
United States v. Tucker, No. 16-CR-91(PKC), 2017 WL 3610587, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017).
2.

Tucker, 2017 WL 3610587, at *1 (explaining that numerous payday loan
businesses—with names that included Ameriloan, One Click Cash, and
others—were owned and operated by Tucker, and shared common
employees, computer systems, and office infrastructure as part of AMG
Services, Inc).

3.

Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. Tucker,
No. 16-CR-91(PKC), 2017 WL 3610587 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2017)
[hereinafter Sentencing Memorandum].

4.

Id. at 3.

5.

Id. at 2–3.

6.

Dornbrook, supra note 1; Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3–4.

7.

Tucker, 2017 WL 3610587, at *2.

8.

In their criminal trial, Muir and Tucker argued that prosecution had failed
to state an offense for the collection of an unlawful debt because the debts
were lawful in that their interest rates were set by “federally recognized
Indian tribes, which have sovereign powers that can be abrogated only
through direction Congressional action.” Id. at *1. The treasurer for the
Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas testified that the purpose of the business
relationship between the tribe and the payday loan businesses was “to get
around the activity of the states establishing more regulations to deal with
the payday loan-type businesses.” Dornbrook, supra note 1.

9.

Dornbrook, supra note 1 (explaining testimony from the Kickapoo Tribe’s
treasurer that the tribe was guaranteed $20,000 per month plus a
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business both in court filings and in interactions with customers.10 To
keep up the charade that the tribes actually owned and operated the
businesses, Tucker and Muir went to elaborate lengths to create a fake
record.11 For example, payday loan employees working in company
offices in Overland Park, Kansas were told to lie about where the
company was located and were even given weather reports for the places
where the tribes were located in case the weather came up during small
talk on the phone with customers.12
Ultimately, their plan was unsuccessful. The Federal Trade
Commission obtained its largest civil court judgment to date—$1.3
billion—against Scott Tucker and one of the payday loan corporations,
AMG Services, Inc.13 Tucker and attorney Timothy Muir were charged
with and convicted of conspiracy to collect unlawful debts, collection of
unlawful debts, wire fraud, money laundering, and Truth in Lending
Act (TILA) violations—all related to collection of usurious interest on
payday loans.14 Attorney Timothy Muir was sentenced to seven years
in prison,15 while Scott Tucker was sentenced to sixteen years and eight
months.16 As this Article goes to press in 2019, both Muir and Tucker
have appealed their convictions. Their cases are pending before the
Second Circuit.17
The field of behavioral legal ethics can provide insight into the
thinking behind the advice that corporate attorneys like Muir provide

percentage of the proceeds above $2 million in lending per month, the
tribe was the “owner” but did not manage or have any financial
obligations to the business, and the tribe’s only obligation was to keep a
company computer (that generated financial reports) in the tribe’s
attorney’s office on the reservation).
10.

Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4.

11.

Id. at 3–4.

12.

Dornbrook, supra note 1.

13.

Lesley Fair, Record $1.3 Billion Ruling Against Scott Tucker and Others
Behind AMG Payday Lending, Fed. Trade Commission: Bus. Blog
(Oct.
4,
2016,
11:19
AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2016/10/record-13-billion-ruling-againstscott-tucker-others-behind [https://perma.cc/5PBE-MWHH].

14.

Dornbrook, supra note 1; Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1
(stating that Tucker and Muir were convicted of fourteen counts arising
from their illegal payday lending scheme).

15.

Dornbrook, supra note 1.

16.

Id.

17.

Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, United States v. Tucker, No. 18-1802CR, 2018 WL 3970222 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2018).
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or fail to provide their corporate clients.18 Traditionally, legal ethics
education has focused on the law governing lawyers.19 Professional
responsibility courses and required attorney ethics continuing legal
education classes deal primarily with professional conduct rules and the
law of professional liability.20 The thinking behind this educational
approach is that if lawyers know the law, they will act consistent with
their ethical and legal obligations.21
Behavioral legal ethics adds the perspective of behavioral science to
the study of legal ethics.22 Behavioral science research explains that
biases, heuristics, and situational factors can have a powerful influence
on ethical decision-making that operates outside of a person’s conscious
awareness.23 Thus, behavioral legal ethics provides a new lens through
which to view and understand attorney decision-making.
This Article draws on legal ethics and behavioral science to explain
what the corporate advisor should do, as well as what we have reason
to believe he may do, when faced with a corporate client’s misguided—
but potentially lucrative—scheme. Part I starts with the corporate
lawyer’s consciously held conceptions and misconceptions about duty
owed to her corporate client when company executives propose a plan
that will create substantial liability for the company—when and if it is
18.

Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45
Ariz. St. L.J. 1107, 1111 (2013) (asserting that many of lawyers’ ethical
lapses “result from a combination of situational pressures and all too
human modes of thinking”).

19.

Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in Legal Education, 16 Clinical L. Rev.
43, 44–45 (2009).

20.

Id. at 50.

21.

See generally Tigran W. Eldred, Insights from Psychology: Teaching
Behavioral Legal Ethics as a Core Element of Professional Responsibility,
2016 Mich. St. L. Rev. 757, 758–59 (2016) (discussing the effectiveness
of teaching behavioral legal ethics).

22.

Id. at 759 (explaining that the central idea of behavioral legal ethics is
that “unethical conduct is frequently the product of psychological factors
that occur largely outside of the conscious awareness of the decisionmaker. The result is that well-intentioned lawyers will often be unaware
of how their behavior diverges from their own conceptions of themselves
as ethical and honest people.”).

23.

See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good
People are Divided by Politics and Religion 70–71 (2012); Jeff
Kaplan & Azish Filabi, Head to Head: A Conversation on Behavioral
Science
and
Ethics,
EthicalSystems.org
(2017),
https://www.ethicalsystems.org/sites/default/files/files/HeadtoHead_P
DF.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MAH-BAJ2] (explaining that behavioral
ethicists study the “situations, mindsets and influences that impact
everyday decisions and actions, as well as the psychological processes that
are likely to encourage unethical behaviors”).
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caught. This Part focuses on the legal ethics piece, without the
behavioral science perspective, and discusses not only what the lawyer
should know but what many falsely believe about their duty.
Then, Part II turns to behavioral science and highlights some of the
key factors that corporate attorneys are unconsciously influenced by as
they try to decide how (or if) to address client conduct that may
amount to a crime or fraud. This discussion moves from attorney selfinterest, to obedience and conformity pressure, and concludes with
partisan bias. While numerous other biases, heuristics, and situational
factors can subtly impact any person’s decision-making,24 these are
some of the most salient influences for the corporate advisor. Both the
consciously held beliefs and unrecognized influences can combine to lead
a well-meaning corporate attorney astray. Research reveals that many
will fail to advise against corporate misconduct, and some will even
become enthusiastic participants in that misconduct.
It is against this backdrop that Part III considers which
interventions could lessen the risk of corporate attorneys providing poor
advice to company agents on the brink of liability-creating conduct.
Again, drawing on legal ethics and behavioral science, this discussion
suggests the pressure points—from priming to education—that are most
likely to result in positive changes in attorney advice. The Article
concludes with thoughts on what corporate attorneys can learn from
the Muir case and behavioral legal ethics in order to provide better
advice to their corporate clients.

I. Consciously Held Conceptions and Misconceptions of
a Lawyer’s Duty When Advising a Corporate Client
About Its (Possibly) Fraudulent or Criminal Plans
An attorney advising a client about planned future conduct has the
legal obligation to help a client understand the prospect of legal liability
arising from that conduct. As a fiduciary, an attorney’s duty of care
obligates the attorney to provide the advice that a competent lawyer
would provide under the circumstances.25 The lawyer’s legal duties as
an advisor are also embodied in professional conduct rules. These rules
remind attorneys of the obligation to provide candid advice and to

24.

See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 18; Eldred, supra note 21.

25.

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52 (Am.
Law Inst. 2000) (describing the lawyer’s standard of care—to “exercise
the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar
circumstances”—for purposes of liability for professional negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty).
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exercise independent professional judgment.26 The rules further explain
that it is the lawyer’s obligation to advise against conduct that is
criminal or fraudulent.27 The attorney’s role is help the client
understand the civil and criminal liability that will be incurred if and
when the conduct is detected—the lawyer should not weigh the
possibility of non-detection or profitability of misconduct.28
Providing a client with information about the risk of liability allows
the client to make an informed decision about future conduct.29
Conventional wisdom is that, in most cases, the client will follow the
lawyer’s advice and thereby avoid liability.30 But regardless of how the
client decides to proceed, the lawyer is legally and ethically prohibited
from facilitating a client’s criminal or fraudulent conduct. The law of
attorney liability provides that an attorney can be held criminally liable
for participation in a client crime31 and civilly liable for participating in
client fraud and client breach of fiduciary duty.32 Moreover, attorney
professional conduct rules require that an attorney withdraw from a

26.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 2.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017).

27.

Id. r. 1.2(d) (prohibiting a lawyer counseling a client to engage in or
assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct); id. r. 1.2 cmt. 11
(noting that a lawyer also cannot counsel or assist in client’s breach of
fiduciary duty when client is a fiduciary); Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 94(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (also noting
that a lawyer should not advise a client to violate a court order).

28.

See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 94 cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (explaining that a lawyer should not
counsel a client about the “degree of risk that a lawyer violation will be
detected or prosecuted”).

29.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017)
(explaining that adequate communication is necessary for the client to
participate in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation
and that the adequacy of communication depends upon the kind of advice
being provided).

30.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that
the purpose of protecting privileged communications “is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice”).

31.

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 8 (Am.
Law Inst. 2000) (describing lawyer liability for criminal offenses
committed in the course of a client representation).

32.

Id. §§ 51, 56–57 (describing circumstances when attorneys have civil
liability to third parties). See, e.g., Thornwood Inc. v. Jenner & Block,
799 N.E.2d 756, 768-69 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003) (allowing client’s
business partner’s claim of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
to proceed against client’s lawyer).
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representation rather than participate in a crime or fraud,33 inform the
client that the lawyer cannot participate in criminal and fraudulent
conduct,34 and take steps to ensure that the lawyer’s services are not
used to facilitate a fraud.35
When the client is an organization (rather than a natural person),
the lawyer-advisor is obligated to protect the client from itself (i.e., take
steps to thwart the client’s plan to engage in conduct that will create
liability for the client). While a lawyer should try to dissuade a natural
person from liability-creating conduct (and has tools at her disposal
that may help convince the client),36 the client is free to make a bad
choice.37 That is not the case for a lawyer’s corporate (or other
organizational) client.38 The lawyer’s duties of competence and loyalty
are owed to the corporation and not to the agents who speak on its
behalf.39 Thus, when those agents plan to engage in criminal or
fraudulent conduct that will create liability for or to the organization,
the lawyer should not defer to those agents and should instead take
steps to protect the corporation from liability.40 Those steps include
33.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.16(a)(1) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017)
(requiring an attorney to withdraw when the representation will result in
violation of law or professional conduct rules).

34.

Id. r. 1.4(a)(5) (requiring attorney to consult with client about limits on
the lawyer’s conduct when client expects assistance prohibited by
professional conduct rules or other law).

35.

Id. r. 4.1 (prohibiting lawyer making a false statement of material fact to
third person or failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting in a crime or fraud except as prohibit by the
confidentiality rule); see also id. r. 1.2, cmt. 10 (describing a lawyer’s
duties to avoid participating in a crime or fraud); id. r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3)
(permitting disclosure of client confidences to avoid assisting in or to
mitigate the damage of a client crime or fraud in which the lawyer
assisted).

36.

See supra notes 33–35. For example, if the lawyer tells the client that the
lawyer will withdraw from the representation and will disclose the fraud
to a third party so that the lawyer can avoid being implicated in the
fraud, the client may be persuaded to avoid the fraudulent conduct. Id.

37.

Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy:
Rethinking the Attorney Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
251, 269 (2011) (explaining that client autonomy may justify allowing a
client that is a natural person to make a “self-destructive, liabilitycreating decision”).

38.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b)-(c), cmt. 3 (Am. Bar
Ass’n 2017).

39.

Id. r. 1.13(b).

40.

Id. r. 1.13, cmt. 3 (explaining that lawyers ordinarily must accept
company agent’s decisions, but not when they engage in conduct that

7
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taking the matter to higher authorities in the organization41 and even
going outside of the organization when doing so will protect the
corporation from liability.42
A common misconception of the corporate advisor’s role is that he
should be a zealous advocate of any plan that is arguably within the
bounds of the law.43 This is the attorney advisor’s “zealous advocacy
misconception.” The origin of this misconception undoubtedly is the
ubiquitous description of lawyer as zealous advocate that can be found
in pop culture,44 the writings of legal ethics scholars,45 and the preamble
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.46 This is not to say that
lawyers should never be zealous advocates. In fact, the conception of
lawyer as zealous advocate frequently aligns with a lawyer’s fiduciary
and ethical duty to a client—such as the courtroom advocate making a
persuasive argument to the jury.47 That is why the phrase is found in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the writings of legal ethics
scholars. It can be an appropriate lawyer mantra—but not always.
violates an obligation owed to the organization or engages in a legal
violation that may be imputed to the organization).
41.

Id. r. 1.13(b).

42.

Id. r. 1.13(c); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i), (iii). This is often referred to as
“loyal disclosure” because the disclosure is in the interest of the
organizational client. See Paula Schaefer, Protecting a Business Entity
Client from Itself Through Loyal Disclosure, 118 Yale L.J. Pocket
Part 152, 152 (2009).

43.

Schaefer, supra note 37, at 252 (quoting corporate attorney Joseph Collins
during his criminal trial as testifying: “I have a duty to represent my
client zealously”); Id. 256–57 (providing evidence that many non-litigators
conceive of their role as zealous advocate).

44.

From the movie Cape Fear:
Sam Bowden: “A lawyer should represent his client . . . .”
Max Cady: “Should ZEALOUSLY represent his client within the
bounds of the law.”
Cape Fear (Universal Pictures 1991); A Contrarian List: Not the
Greatest Legal Movie Lines of All Time, Irreverent Law. (Feb. 21,
2012), https://lawmrh.wordpress.com/2012/02/24/a-contrarian-list-notthe-greatest-legal-movie-lines-of-all-time/
[https://perma.cc/M98QYFKM].

45.

See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale
L.J. 1239, 1243 (1991) (describing zealous advocacy as the narrative that
conveys the ideal of the American legal profession).

46.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl ¶¶ 8, 9 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017).

47.

Schaefer, supra note 37, at 262–63 (explaining why zealous advocacy in a
courtroom is consistent with an attorney’s duty to a client and why it is
not in the advising context).

8
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There is a mismatch between zealous-advocacy-within-the-boundsof-the-law and the duty of a corporate lawyer advising about possibly
fraudulent or criminal conduct. Lawyers advising clients about future
conduct fail their clients—and fail to fulfill their legal and ethical
obligations to their clients—if they take this simplistic zealous advocate
view of their role. A zealous advocate of any client scheme that is
arguably within the bounds of law will fail to provide the advice a client
needs.48 A client cannot make an informed choice about how to avoid
liability if the lawyer-advisor is advocating for the scheme, rather than
advising about the risk of liability for the planned course of conduct.49
For a corporate client whose agents might be interested in the short
term gains of fraudulent conduct, the attorney’s obligation to advise
(rather than to zealously advocate) is critical to the client’s interests.50
It is important to note an important distinction here. Partisan bias
can make it difficult for any lawyer—whether a litigator or an advisor—
to objectively judge “the bounds of the law” or the “prospect of legal
liability.”51 Partisan bias will be discussed later in this Article.52 The
zealous advocacy misconception described here is a different problem
and unique to the attorney-advisor.53 A belief or mindset that it is the
48.

Id. at 258–64 (describing how zealous encouragement of the client’s
plans—so long as they are within the technical bounds of the law—does
not serve the client’s interests).

49.

Id. at 263 (explaining that if a lawyer zealously advocates for a client’s
agenda, the client may not understand that the plan leaves him vulnerable
to liability).

50.

Id. at 269 (“The entity client, more than any other client, needs a legal
advisor to make judgments about what conduct may create legal liability
and to protect it from such decisions.”).

51.

Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 Ind. L.J.
1639, 1643–44 (2015) (calling into question the assumption of the
dominant theory of legal ethics that lawyers are capable of simultaneously
acting as partisans and objectively determining “the line between
permissible and impermissible behavior”).

52.

See infra Part II.D.

53.

Some scholars disagree with this view. They would say that all attorneys
can and should be zealous advocates within the bounds of the law, and
the problem is not with zeal but that some lawyers have difficulty judging
“the bounds of the law.” Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 Hofstra
L. Rev. 1165, 1172 (2006) (arguing that zeal is not the culprit when
attorneys take actions that harm their own clients); W. William Hodes,
We Need More Zealousness, Not Less—But Within the Bounds of the
Law, Res Gestae, Mar. 2001, at 46. But this contrary view misses two
key points. First, an attorney advising about possibly fraudulent or
possibly criminal conduct will be unlikely to advise against the conduct if
he views his role as being a zealous advocate of anything that is arguably
within the bounds of the law. This means that in the absence of a black
and white violation of law—which is seldom the case in the corporate

9
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legal advisor’s proper role to zealously pursue (rather than advise
against) the client’s stated goals unless those goals are clearly illegal is
a misconception of the lawyer-advisor’s legal and ethical duty. When
this twisted conception of duty is combined with some or all of the
behavioral factors discussed in the next Part, it is easy to understand
why lawyer-advisors sometimes facilitate corporate client misconduct.

II. Behavioral Legal Ethics Explanations for Why
Attorneys May Not Advise Against Corporate
Client Crime and Fraud
A corporate attorney’s conscious understanding of his legal and
ethical obligations is only part of the story.54 There are other factors—
often working outside of the attorney’s conscious awareness—that
influence the advice the attorney provides when a corporate client
proposes arguably fraudulent or possibly criminal conduct. Drawing on
behavioral science research, this Part explores some of the factors that
may influence a corporate lawyer to provide bad advice to a client.
A. The Role of Attorney Self-Interest

In Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, Tigran Eldred demonstrates
that criminal defense lawyers are unaware that their own self-interest
heavily influences the poor representation they provide their indigent
clients.55 These lawyers have a blind spot to perceiving that a conflict
of interest—between their interests and that of their clients—is causing
their performance to come up short.56 While it may seem that indigent
criminal defense lawyers and corporate advisors would have little in
common, that is not the case. Eldred’s research is revealing of how selfworld—the corporate advisor will advocate what he should advise against.
Second, why should the corporate advisor be advocating, zealously or
otherwise? In order for a client to make an informed decision about a
course of conduct, the client needs advice and not advocacy.
54.

In the 2011 article in which I argued that zealous advocacy by legal
advisors was not in the corporate client’s interest, I stated: “Because many
factors contribute to how lawyers represent their business clients, I
acknowledge that a shift in thinking away from zealous advocacy is not a
panacea.” Schaefer, supra note 37, at 282. In the present Article, I attempt
to address some of those other factors.

55.

Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving
Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 Rutgers L.
Rev. 333, 339 (2012) (explaining that attorneys “fail to perceive
themselves as unethical in situations in which their own self-interest
conflits with duties owed to others”).

56.

Id.
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interest can influence any lawyer to unwittingly provide incompetent
representation to a client when the client’s interest is misaligned with
that of the lawyer.
Eldred explains the importance of a criminal defense lawyer
conducting an investigation of the underlying facts,57 and describes how
the failure to investigate can have disastrous consequences for clients.58
Yet, the indigent criminal defense lawyer has little or no personal
interest in providing that investigation. Whether an overworked public
defender or a lawyer taking a court appointed case with a capped fee,
any time dedicated to an investigation is not in the attorney’s financial
interests.59 And if the attorney fails to undertake an investigation and
the client is harmed, the attorney is unlikely to suffer any adverse
consequences (such as malpractice liability).60 In summary: if the lawyer
investigates, it is not beneficial to her personally and if she fails to
investigate, there is little to fear. Thus, the attorney’s interests in doing
little to nothing conflict with the indigent client’s interests in counsel
conducting an investigation.
But most indigent criminal defense attorneys do not engage in a
cold calculation not to investigate because it is in their self-interest.
They believe they are providing a quality representation to their clients,
even though they are not.61 Eldred draws on research about the dual
processes of human decision-making: automatic processes (those that
are “fast, effortless, involuntary . . . and not accessible to
introspection”) and controlled processes (“slow, effortful, voluntary,
and accessible to introspection”).62 He explains that an attorney’s selfinterest influences her professional decision-making automatically, and
this happens before her effortful and slower processes of deliberation
(about professional conduct obligations) kick in. Eldred concludes: “The
result is that the automatic preferences for self-interest will often be the
driving force behind a decision, even when the decision maker believes
that the choice resulted from an objective evaluation of relevant
considerations.”63
57.

Id. at 340–44.

58.

Id. at 344–47.

59.

Id. at 348–50.

60.

Id. at 350–51.

61.

Id. at 351–52 (concluding that many indigent criminal defense attorneys
“are likely to believe that they are making calculations in each case based
on what is best for the client”).

62.

Id. at 360; see also, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow 20–
24 (2011) (referring to the automatic processes as “System 1” and the
effortful processes as “System 2”).

63.

Eldred, supra note 55, at 362.
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When the unconscious influence of self-interest combines with
situational pressures64 and “the biased way that people tend to seek out
and interpret information,”65 the indigent criminal defense lawyer may
reason that entering a plea deal—despite completing no investigation
and engaging in no advocacy on the client’s behalf—is in the client’s
interest. Eldred explains that the indigent criminal defense attorney
starts from the view that the self-interested option of no investigation
is justified, and then confirmation bias and motivated reasoning
influences the attorney to seek out information consistent with this view
(i.e., evidence of guilt).66
For precisely the opposite reason, attorney self-interest can
significantly—but invisibly to the attorneys—influence the poor advice
they provide their corporate clients contemplating fraudulent conduct.
Corporate executives like Scott Tucker in the payday loan case, hire
and consult with attorneys who they hope will help facilitate their
money-making schemes.67 These corporate advisors have an immediate
financial incentive to give the corporate client (via that executive) all
of the zealous-advocacy-within-the-arguable-bounds-of-the-law the
company can afford. Corporate advisors keep their jobs (as inside or
outside counsel) when they keep executives happy; they do this by
finding ways to implement corporate executives’ plans, and not by
saying no.68 In the payday loan case, Timothy Muir made over $10
million in advising and assisting the payday loan businesses through
the years.69 While other situational pressures and biases (discussed in
the following parts) also play a role, the corporate lawyer’s self-interest
plays a role in the attorney failing to provide advice that the actual
client—the corporation—had an interest in receiving.70
64.

Id. at 352–56 (describing how informal norms, organizational culture, and
obedience pressure can impact attorney decision-making).

65.

Id. at 362–64.

66.

Id. at 370. Eldred explains that, in a system in which many attorneys
start from the premise that their clients are guilty, there is reason to
believe counsel will unwittingly seek out evidence of the client’s guilt and
be skeptical of any contrary evidence. Id. at 364 and 371–72.

67.

See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and
Independence, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2009) (discussing the fact that
some clients are not seeking legal advice, but rather “legal cover”).

68.

Being fired is such an obvious risk for in-house or outside counsel who do
not keep executives happy that professional conduct rules give specific
guidance to attorney who is fired for engaging in up-the-ladder reporting.
See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(e) (Am. Bar Ass’n
2017).

69.

Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 3.

70.

Professors Richard Moorhead and Rachel Cahill-O’Callaghan reached the
same conclusion through their research. Richard Moorhead & Rachel
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In the final analysis, money is a key influence for both groups of
lawyers, even though neither would identify it as such. Lawyers
representing indigent criminal defendants provide less zealous advocacy
because it is not in their financial interest to do so, while corporate
advisors provide more zealous advocacy because it is in their financial
interest to do so. In both scenarios, the representation provided is not
in the client’s interest. The indigent criminal defendant needs more
advocacy and the corporate client needs more advice about liability and
less advocacy.
B. Obedience Pressure

An attorney’s advice—or lack of advice—about possibly fraudulent
or criminal conduct will be influenced by the people who surround the
attorney.71 Obedience research explains the power an authority figure
or colleagues have to influence bad advice. In the case of a corporate
attorney addressing planned conduct that may be criminal or
fraudulent, the authority figure is likely the corporate executive that
the attorney reports to in the professional relationship.
Stanley Milgram’s 1960’s work on obedience was groundbreaking.72
His purpose was to determine how far a person would go in carrying
out an authority figure’s instructions, as those instructions came
increasingly into conflict with the person’s conscience.73 In Milgram’s
experiment, test subjects were told that they were participating in a
study concerning punishment’s impact on learning.74 A person in a
white lab coat (the authority figure) directed the experiment’s subjects
Cahill-O’Callaghan, False Friends? Testing Commercial Lawyers on the
Claim that Zealous Advocacy Is Founded in Benevolence Towards Clients
Rather than Lawyers’ Personal Interest, 19 Legal Ethics 30 (2016).
Moorhead and Cahill-O’Callaghan surveyed commercial lawyers (both in
private practice and in-house) about their values and their “inclinations
towards zeal” in representing their corporate clients. They determined
that attorneys more inclined to providing a zealous representation were
those who were motivated to act in their own interest. Id.
71.

Eldred, supra note 21, at 766 (explaining “situationism” as the “notion
that subtle aspects of the situation play a significant role in how decisions
are reached”).

72.

See, e.g., Jerry M. Burger, Situational Features in Milgram’s Experiment
That Kept His Participants Shocking, 70 J. Soc’y For Psychol. Study
Soc. Issues 489, 489 (“For half a century, the findings from Stanley
Milgram’s obedience studies have been among the most intriguing and
widely discussed data ever to come out of a psychology lab.”).

73.

Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority An Experimental
View 3 (1974).

74.

Id. Subjects were all men, but were drawn from a variety of backgrounds,
including postal clerks, salesmen, laborers, and teachers. Id. at 14–16.
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to flip a switch that would provide an electric shock to a “learner” (who
was strapped to a chair and connected to an electrode) when the learner
provided an incorrect answer to a question.75 The subjects were put in
control of a shock generator that contained thirty switches that ranged
from 15 volts (marked “Slight Shock”) all the way to 450 volts (two
switches prior were marked “Danger: Severe Shock” and the final two
switches were marked XXX.).76 The subject was directed to provide
shocks of increasing intensity with each incorrect answer.77 Though the
learner was hidden from the subject’s view, the subject could hear the
learner’s increasingly loud and emotional grunts and then screams as
he was shocked after each incorrect answer.78 When the learner pleaded
for the shocks to stop, the subject would invariably look to the man in
the white lab coat for direction; that man consistently told the subject
that the experiment must continue.79
Milgram described the chief finding of his experiment as the extent
to which the subjects were willing to act against their conscience and
defer to the authority figure.80 The experiment revealed that almost
two-thirds of study participants were willing to shock the learner at the
direction of the man in the lab coat.81 In post-experiment interviews,
Milgram found that most subjects did not view themselves as
responsible for their conduct.82 Subjects explained they would not have
engaged in this conduct themselves but that they did it because they
were required to by the authority figure.83 The situation made subjects

75.

Id. at 3. The learner’s task was to memorize a list of word pairs. He would
receive a shock if he failed to recall the correct pairing. Id.

76.

Id. at 20.

77.

Id. at 3

78.

Id. at 4.

79.

Id. at 4; see also id. at 21 (describing the language the experimenter used
to prod the subject to continue, such as “[t]he experiment requires that
you continue” and “[y]ou have no other choice, you must go on”).

80.

“It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the
command of an authority that constitutes the chief finding of the study
and the fact most urgently demanding explanation.” Id. at 5.

81.

Id. at 5; see also id. at 33 (stating that twenty-six of forty subjects obeyed
the authority figure, providing shocks to the highest level on the
generator).

82.

Id. at 7.

83.

Id. at 8.
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more likely to engage in wrongful conduct: they perceived the man in
the lab coat and not themselves to be responsible.84
In subsequent studies, Milgram described the experiment to
numerous individuals and asked them to predict whether they
personally would continue the shocks to the end.85 Not a single person
predicted that he or she would comply with the authority figure all the
way to the highest level.86 They predicted their own reaction-disobeying
authority would flow from their sense of justice, empathy, and
compassion.87 In another survey, Milgram asked Yale psychology
students to predict the behavior of 100 hypothetical subjects in the
study.88 They predicted that between 0 and 3 percent would shock to
the end.89 Obviously, the numbers from Milgram’s experiment do not
bear out these predictions. The authority figure wields a tremendous
amount of power over most subjects, calling into question a commonly
held view that only “bad” people would be obedient under such
circumstances.90
This obedience research provides insight into why a corporate
attorney may fail to advise an authority figure against a fraudulent
scheme.91 For payday loan attorney Timothy Muir, his authority figure
was company CEO Scott Tucker.92 Tucker was the person who had
hired Muir in his first job out of law school and the individual who
84.

Burger, supra note 72, at 495–96 (“Milgram created a situation in which
his participants could easily deny or diffuse responsibility for hurting the
learner.”).

85.

Milgram, supra note 73, at 27–28. Individuals from three groups were
asked for their predictions: psychologists, college students, and middleclass adults of various occupations.

86.

Id. at 28 (noting that of 110 respondents, all believed they would disobey
the authority figure at some point prior to the final switch).

87.

Id. at 30.

88.

Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Abnormal Soc.
Psychol. 371, 375 (1963).

89.

Id.

90.

Milgram, supra note 73, at 5 (explaining that a commonly offered
explanation is that only “monsters, the sadistic fringe of society,” would
inflict a shock at the most severe level).

91.

Other behavioral legal ethics scholars have used Milgram’s obedience
research to explain wrongful obedience of new attorneys working under
the direction of a senior attorney. See generally Catherine Gage O’Grady,
Wrongful Obedience and the Professional Practice of Law, 19 J. L. Bus.
& Ethics 9 (2013); see also Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by
Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 Hofstra L.
Rev. 451 (2007).

92.

Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 2.
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continued to employ Tucker when he started his own law firm.93 So
while the corporation was Muir’s actual client, Muir would have looked
to Tucker for direction. Milgram’s findings suggest it would have been
difficult for Muir to say no to Tucker and advise him against his
planned conduct.
C. Conformity Pressure

A decade before Milgram’s obedience experiments, Solomon Asch
studied the impact of conformity (or “social pressure”) on human
behavior.94 In Asch’s experiment, a subject and a group of six to eight
confederates were told to pick which of three lines on one card matched
the length of a single line on another card.95 The difference between the
lines was not subtle: the correct answer was always readily apparent.96
The group was told this was an experiment in visual judgment, but in
reality, the purpose of the experiment was to determine whether and to
what extent the subject would follow the group if the group picked the
obviously wrong answer.97
As instructed, in the first two rounds, the confederates picked the
correct matching line, and the experiment’s subject followed suit.98 But
in most subsequent rounds,99 all of the confederates picked the
(obviously) wrong line.100 Despite the obvious error, the subjects agreed
with the majority’s wrong answer 36.8 percent of the time.101 In a video
of a modern recreation of Asch’s experiment, the subjects’ facial
expressions reveal obvious discomfort as they choose whether to pick
the wrong line in order to conform to the group.102

93.

Id.

94.

Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, Sci. Am., Nov. 1955, at
31 (Nov. 1955).

95.

Id. at 32.

96.

Id. (providing example of what the subjects were shown); see also id. at
32–33 (stating that in ordinary circumstances, an individual matching the
lines would make a mistake less than 1 percent of the time).

97.

Id. at 32.

98.

Id.

99.

The confederates unanimously pick the incorrect answer in twelve of
eighteen rounds. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 33.
102. The video shows the subjects’ facial expressions in response to the
experiment beginning two minutes into the video. Follow the Leader,
YouTube,
(July
23,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ME4lOsQzcIE
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In interviewing the subjects after the experiment, Asch was
interested in understanding the reasons some subjects never conformed
to the group’s wrong answer, while others consistently deferred to the
majority.103 Many of the independent subjects explained that they did
not feel pressured by the group because they were confident in their
own judgment.104 For the conformists, many explained their conformity
by stating that they had decided that the majority must be right.105
Others stated that they followed the group because they did not want
to ruin the results of (what they believed to be) the experiment.106 Asch
found most unsettling that some of the conformists admitted that they
followed the majority to hide what they perceived as a defect in
themselves.107
Subsequent iterations of Asch’s experiment revealed that even a
small number of confederates unanimously picking the wrong answer
influenced the subject.108 If the size of the confederate group was three
or larger, the subjects conformed at a similar rate.109
Asch’s research should be particularly concerning for lawyers. For
Asch’s subjects, the stakes were low—the subjects likely did not know
the other participants in the study and had no ongoing relationship
with them.110 Further, the right answer was black and white, and they
still felt pressured to choose the wrong answer selected by the
majority.111 For a corporate lawyer addressing possibly fraudulent or
[https://perma.cc/NC92-QHVB] (showing the video originally created by
Dateline NBC in 1997).
103. Asch, supra note 94, at 33.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Asch described another group of the conformists as “suspect[ing] that
the majority were ‘sheep’ following the first responder or that the majority
were victims of an optical illusion.” Asch concluded: “Nevertheless, these
suspicions failed to free them at the moment of decision.” Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 34.
109. Id. (explaining that when a single individual answered incorrectly, it had
little impact on the subject; when two confederates answered incorrectly,
the subjects conformed 13.6 percent of the time; when the confederate
group expanded to three, conformity jumped to 31.8 percent; further
increases in group size did not have a significant impact on conformance
of the subject).
110. Id. at 32 (explaining that the participants in the experiment were male
college students from three institutions of higher learning).
111. In Asch’s words, the subject “finds himself unexpectedly in a minority of
one, opposed by a unanimous and arbitrary majority with respect to a
clear and simple fact.” Id.
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criminal conduct, the group (with whom she feels pressure to conform)
might be fellow attorneys or other decision makers at the corporation.
When handling the corporate client’s lucrative but possibly fraudulent
plan, the lawyer’s interest in pleasing the group is higher than that of
Asch’s subjects. Further, for the corporate advisor, more ambiguity
surrounds which answer is “right.” This ambiguity makes it even easier
for the lawyer to justify picking the majority’s preferred answer.
In an interview following his conviction, Timothy Muir discussed
the conformity pressure he faced, as a recent law school graduate, when
he began working for Scott Tucker’s payday loan company.112 Muir
explained, “There was no job description when I started [in 2006, as a
2004 law school graduate]. I joined a very large legal team that [Tucker]
had retained through the years.”113 In defending his role in a letter to
the Kansas City Business Journal, Muir “profess[ed] that he simply
followed the lead of other attorneys before him and operated in good
faith that his actions met the legal standard.”114 While Muir does not
use the words “conformity pressure,” the description he provides
matches Asch’s findings.115 Because all of the other attorneys agreed
that the client’s conduct was legal, he simply followed the lead of the
group.
D. Partisan Bias

Partisanship can detract from a person’s ability to objectively judge
the facts. Anyone who has ever watched a football game with a fan of
the other team understands partisan bias: a person’s alliance causes him
to perceive and interpret facts (such as the justness of a penalty) in a
way that favors his team.116 It is difficult for a fan to be objective.117
And while it is easy to see that lack of objectivity in a fan for the other
team, it can be close to impossible to see it in yourself.
112. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 2–3.
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id. at 3.
115. See Asch, supra note 94, at 34 (noting that “[w]hen consensus comes under
the dominance of conformity, the social process is polluted and the
individual at the same time surrenders the powers on which his
functioning as a feeling and thinking being depends”).
116. Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study,
49 J. Abnormal Soc. Psychol. 129, 129–30 (1954) (describing an
experiment in which fans of Dartmouth and Princeton were asked to
watch footage of a football game between their teams and count the rule
violations of each team, rate each flagrant or mild, and judge which team
started the rough play).
117. Id. at 130–32 (describing the stark differences between how each group of
fans interpreted the rule violations and rough play in the game).
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Partisan bias—and other biases—impact how people filter and
interpret information.118 A person’s partisanship influences a person to
give attention to facts that are favorable to his preexisting beliefs.119
Thereafter, partisan bias influences how that information—that was
noticed as most relevant—is interpreted.120 In the final analysis, two
people can observe the same facts but because of their partisan views
they will pay attention to different facts as most important and
interpret those facts favorably to their partisan position.
The impact of partisanship on lawyer’s interpretation of
information is readily apparent in experiments focusing on lawyers (and
law students). The research reveals that partisanship makes it difficult
for a lawyer to filter and interpret information objectively.121 One study
found that students who participated in a moot court competition
overwhelmingly perceived that their assigned side had the better case.122
In another study, subjects were asked to play the role of attorney for
plaintiff or defendant in determining the settlement value of a case.123
Even though both sides received identical information, those who were
randomly assigned to play the plaintiff predicted an award substantially
higher than that predicted by the defendant.124 In a study involving
lawyers making predictions about the value of their cases, researchers
compared attorney predictions with actual outcomes.125 The research
revealed that lawyers, regardless of years of legal experience, were
overconfident in their predictions.126
It is worth noting that partisan bias can be a powerful, positive tool
for a lawyer. Take the example of a litigator. If partisan bias cements
her firm belief in her client’s interpretation of the facts, then she may
become a better advocate in the courtroom. Not being able to see the
possibility that the opponent is right may make it easier to point out
118. Robertson, supra note 67, at 6–10.
119. Id. at 7–8.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listoken, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype
and Should They? A Natural Experiment, 41 J. of Legal Stud., 239,
239–42 (2012).
123. Robertson, supra note 67, at 8 (citing George Loewenstein et al., SelfServing Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. Legal
Stud. 135, 145–46 (1993)).
124. Id. at 8.
125. Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability
to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 133, 133
(2010).
126. Id. at 144.
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to the jury all of the flaws in the opponent’s position. Of course, such
partisanship makes it difficult for the litigator to advise the client of
the weaknesses in its case or to provide a neutral assessment of whether
the client should settle.127 But on the whole, there is undoubtedly a
benefit in the litigator’s partisan bias.
For the corporate advisor, though, partisan bias can make it more
difficult for him to do his job. It is essential that the advisor be able to
make a judgment about the prospect of liability for a planned course of
conduct in order to competently advise a client. If the corporate
advisor’s bias inhibits his ability to recognize the risk of liability, she
will be less likely to provide the client the advice it needs.128 While the
lawyer’s partisanship and loyalty are owed to the corporation and not
company executives,129 the evidence—research and anecdotal—reflects
that corporate advisors play the role of partisan of company executives
who want a proposed course of conduct to be legal.130
Finally, it is noteworthy that the advisor’s partisan bias problem is
different from the zealous advocacy problem discussed earlier.131 Even
the lawyer who properly views her role as an advisor responsible for
protecting the client from serious liability will find it difficult to
recognize the risk that conduct may be fraudulent or criminal because
of partisan bias.132
While it is impossible to know the impact of partisan bias on
Timothy Muir’s advice, the hallmarks of it are present in his case. When
Muir discussed his conduct with a reporter after his conviction, he still
did not recognize that he had engaged in illegal conduct.133 The reporter
127. Robertson, supra note 67, at 8–9 (explaining that partisan bias research
reveals that lawyers with identical information place significantly different
values on their clients’ cases, which means these lawyers will provide
misleading and unhelpful settlement advice to their clients).
128. See supra Part III.
129. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2018)
(explaining that the organization is the client).
130. This partisanship favoring executives is undoubtedly a product of other
topics discussed in this Article: attorney self-interest and obedience
pressure. Suggestions for how advisors could be guided in reconceptualizing partisanship and the corporate client’s interests are
discussed in Part III. See supra Part III.
131. See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text.
132. See Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 1, 3. Of course, for the advisor who views
her role as a zealous advocate, she has a double burden of bias and zeal
that weighs against her ability to make an independent judgment that the
client should be dissuaded of engaging in a course of conduct that is likely
fraudulent or criminal. See id.; supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text.
133. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
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described Muir as believing “he was wrongly convicted.”134 Muir
insisted: “All of my [payday loan] clients, and myself, believed
wholeheartedly in the legality of their business model.”135 If Muir is to
be believed, partisan bias could explain why he was unable recognize
an alternate interpretation of the facts—that the payday loan
companies were engaged in fraudulent conduct. If partisanship blinded
him to that possibility, it would have been impossible for him to provide
the advice his clients needed in order to avoid liability.

III. Influencing Better Corporate Legal Advice
through the Lessons of Behavioral Legal Ethics
Understanding that a variety of factors influence a corporate
advisor’s conscious and unconscious thought processes, where are the
“pressure points” at which a change might result in improved advising?
Drawing on law and behavioral science, this Part suggests that
attorneys might be influenced to better protect their corporate clients
through introducing additional authority figures, priming, education,
and changes in attorney consequences for those who fail to protect their
corporate clients. This discussion considers which of the various
stakeholders—corporations, rule makers, and the attorneys
themselves—is in the best position to leverage our knowledge of
attorneys’ motivation and thought process.
A. Interventions to Combat a Corporate Attorney’s Wrongful Obedience
and Conformity

Both Milgram and Asch identified a similar situational factor that
can reduce wrongful obedience and conformity. They found that the
introduction of additional dissenting voices—peers in the case of
conformity or a competing authority figure in the case of obedience—
changed the subject’s behavior.136
In one of numerous variations on Milgram’s original experiment,
the subject (the individual tasked with shocking the “learner”) was
given competing instructions from two authority figures—each in a lab
coat and each apparently playing a similar role in conducting the
experiment.137 When the learner loudly protested at the 150-volt level,
134. Id. at 1.
135. Id. at 3.
136. Milgram, supra note 73 at 105–07; Asch, supra note 94, at 34.
137. Milgram, supra note 73 at 105–06 (explaining that the two
“experimenters” alternated reciting instructions, were seated behind a
control table, and actively recorded the responses). Id. at 107–08
(describing the efforts made to equalize the experimenters’ apparent
authority).
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the experimenters provided the subject with contradictory
commands.138 One told him that he must continue the experiment, while
the other told the subject the experiment has to stop.139 Of twenty
subjects, eighteen immediately ended the experiment, one ended the
experiment at the following volt level, and one had already stopped
prior to the disagreement between the experimenters.140 Milgram notes
that some subjects spent time trying to determine, unsuccessfully,
which of the two experimenters was the boss.141 Based on the results of
this variation on the basic experiment, Milgram concluded that because
there was not a “higher” authority to follow, the subject was unable to
proceed.142
Asch also introduced dissenting voices into later iterations of his
experiment.143 Recall in Asch’s original experiment, the subject was
faced with defying the unanimous crowd if he were to pick the correct
answer to the line matching problem.144 In a subsequent twist, Asch
introduced one individual into the group who chose the right answer.145
Even though the vast majority still selected the wrong line, the
additional individual did not and that helped the subject ignore the
majority and pick the right line.146
To an extent, attorney professional conduct rules are constructed
to take advantage of some of Milgram’s and Asch’s lessons about
additional voices’ impact on authority and conformity. First, on the
topic of conformity, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(4)
allows an attorney to reveal confidential information to secure legal
138. Id. at 105–06.
139. Id. at 106 (explaining that the experimenters directed their remarks not
to one another but to the subject; a transcript of the exchange starts with
one stating, “[w]e’ll have to stop,” which was followed by the other
experimenter responding, “[t]he experiment requires that we go on. Please
continue, teacher.”).
140. Id. at 107.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 111 (explaining that within an authority system, when there are
contradictory commands, the subject determines who is in charge and
follows that person’s direction, and if that is not possible, “action cannot
proceed.” In other words, Milgram did not conclude that the subject
followed the direction that he preferred, but rather that the subject
stopped because there was not a higher authority to follow).
143. Asch, supra note 94, at 34.
144. Id. at 32.
145. Id. at 34.
146. Id. (noting that subjects answered incorrectly only one fourth as often
under this variation as against the unanimous and wrong majority).
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advice about compliance with his professional conduct obligations.147
Thus, an attorney is allowed to seek another dissenting voice that might
embolden her to defy the group. Of course, like Asch’s subjects, the
attorney must recognize that the group is (or may be) wrong before the
attorney would take this step of seeking another opinion.
Second, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(b) attempts to
interpose competing authorities, making it easier for the corporation’s
attorney to defer to someone else who wants to stop the criminal or
fraudulent conduct.148 One of the problems with the current rule is that
it is so complex and ambiguous it may be difficult for attorneys to
understand that the goal is protecting the client. The following
discussion on priming addresses these issues and suggests some edits to
Rule 1.13(b) that will clarify the attorney’s role.
B. Priming Corporate Advisors to Protect the Corporation from Liability

Research on priming reveals the powerful influence that words (and
images, ideas, gestures, and more) can have on human behavior—all
outside the conscious awareness of the actor.149 For example, if a person
reads the word “eat” and is then asked to create a word from the
fragment “SO_P,” she is more likely to complete the word as “SOUP”
than “SOAP.”150 She will do the opposite if exposed to the word wash
before engaging in the completion exercise.151 In his book Thinking, Fast
and Slow, Daniel Kahneman explains that priming activates associated
thoughts and ideas, and that this thinking automatic, silent, and hidden
from our conscious selves.152
Priming studies provide fascinating evidence of how even the
subtlest forms of priming can influence human conduct. Asking subjects
to look at cartoons while holding a pencil in their mouths will influence
them to think the cartoons are more or less funny depending on whether
the pencil forced a “smile” or a “frown.”153 Voters who cast their ballots
in schools are more likely to support initiatives seeking funding for
schools.154 Experiment subjects who are exposed to words that evoke
147. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6(b)(4) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017).
148. Id. r. 1.13(b).
149. Kahneman, supra note 62, at 52–58.
150. Id. at 52.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 50–52.
153. Id. at 54 (unknown to the subject of the experiment, the pencil forces a
“frown” when the eraser end is held in the mouth and a “smile” when the
pencil is held in the middle with the eraser to the right and the point to
the left).
154. Id. at 55.
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images of the elderly—bald, gray, wrinkled, and Florida—are primed
to think about old age, which in turn primes them to walk more slowly
when they walk to a new location.155
Particularly pertinent to the issue of priming attorneys, a number
of studies reveal the impact of priming on ethical decision-making. For
example, office coffee drinkers are more likely to contribute to the office
coffee fund when photos of eyes are placed above the coffee maker than
when photos of flowers adorned the wall.156 Less cheating occurs when
students are primed to think about (and affirm a commitment to)
honesty before completing a task or exam.157 Further, a number of
studies reveal that priming subjects with money poses a danger to
ethical decision-making.158 For example, in one experiment subjects who
were exposed to money-related words were substantially more likely to
indicate (in a later portion of the experiment) that they would engage
in unethical behavior in hypothetical scenarios.159
At least three groups—rule makers, companies, and attorneys—
should consider how priming could (and already does) influence a
corporate attorney’s advice about seemingly lucrative, but potentially
criminal, conduct. First, these groups should study the priming that is
already occurring. For example, if a corporation keeps its stock price
front and center—whether on the company website, in messaging
directed to employees, or even (as it was at Enron) displayed in the
building160—the company and its attorneys should recognize the impact
that prime may have on legal advice. Attorneys bombarded with
messages about company finances may be primed to help the
corporation engage in misconduct that is profitable in the short term.161
Rulemaking committees should consider the possibility that
professional conduct rules are already priming attorney behavior. A
corporate attorney faced with questionable conduct may consult the
155. Id. at 53.
156. Id. at 57–58.
157. Dan Ariely, The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty 41–45 (2012).
158. Francesca Gino & Cassie Mogilner, Time, Money and Morality, 25
Psychol. Sci., 414, 414 (2014) (explaining research that reveals that
when people focus on money, they act in self-interested ways, such as
cheating); Kahneman, supra note 62 at 55 (providing examples of how
priming with money “produce[s] some troubling effects”).
159. Maryam Kouchaki et al., Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers
a Business Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes, Organizational
Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 53, 55 (2013).
160. Peter Elkind & Bethany McLean, The Smartest Guys in the
Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2004).
161. See generally Kahneman, supra note 62, at 55–56 (describing the effects
of priming people with money).
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up-the-ladder reporting provision of Rule 1.13.162 In addition to suffering
from complex and often ambiguous language,163 the rule references the
company’s “best interests” and prompts the attorney to consider
whether conduct is “likely to result in substantial injury” to the
organization.164 Even though the goal is encouraging attorneys to take
concerns of misconduct to higher authorities in the organization, the
rule may prime attorneys to advocate that questionable conduct is not
likely to injure and may even be in the best interests of the company.165
Second, all three audiences should consider how corporate attorneys
could be primed to provide better advice in the face of planned
misconduct. But what language should be the prime? A prime that
suggests lawyers should “protect the corporate client from liability”
may be a workable option. The language emphasizes the positive
(attorneys should help their client), the word “protect” likely triggers
associations of safeguarding the client’s interests, and the language
provides simple direction that the client should be protected from
liability.
Finally, attorneys, corporations, and rule makers should decide how
to deliver the prime. Attorneys should consider ways to display the
protect-the-client-from-liability prime in their offices.166 For
corporations, it may be as important to prime other company decision
makers as it is to prime attorneys. In that way, everyone working for
the company may associate avoiding liability as in the corporation’s
interest. A corporate code of conduct could be an avenue for conveying
this message.167 For a prime to work, it must be something attorneys
(and other decision makers) are exposed to at times when it will
influence advice (and receptiveness to advice).168 This could be achieved
162. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017).
163. See Eldred, supra note 55, at 378 (“One of the most important factors
that can accentuate the power of automatic [decision-making] processes is
ambiguity in controlling rules, which makes it easier for people to
unconsciously believe that they are acting in a responsible manner.”).
164. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017).
165. This interpretation was not the intent behind these rules but is how they
have often been interpreted. See Schaefer, supra note 37, at 279–80.
166. Eldred, supra note 21, at 799–800 (explaining that he provides each
Professional Responsibility student a quote about ethical decision-making
that he hopes they will keep in their workspace when they are lawyers).
167. See, e.g., Deloitte, Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct
(2016); Allete, Code of Business Conduct (2015); see also Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Institution Letter on Corporate Codes of Conduct:
Guidance on Implementing an Effective Ethics Program (Oct. 21, 2005).
168. Kahneman, supra note 62, at 50–51 (explaining how priming works in a
“second or two”).
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with a code of conduct card—perhaps the size of a business card—that
company decision makers are encouraged to carry with them or keep
within eyesight in their offices.
Rule makers should consider amending professional conduct rules
to provide a better prime to corporate attorneys faced with an agent’s
planned misconduct. As noted above, the current Model Rule 1.13(b)
is most pertinent—it is the rule that addresses what an organization’s
attorney should do when faced with potentially liability-creating
misconduct.169 That rule could be revised as follows to provide corporate
attorneys with a prime to protect the client from liability:
If a lawyer for an organization knows learns that an officer,
employee or other person associated with agent of the
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act
in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a
legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, or
planning conduct that may result in liability for the organization
(or liability of the agent to the organization), then the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not
necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the
lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to
take action to protect the organization from liability, including
advising the agent and higher authorities within the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization against the
conduct as determined by applicable law.

The revised rule takes the prime front and center: protect the
organization from liability. While the proposed amendment
substantially simplifies the language of the rule, it does not change the
rule’s substance.170At a time when an attorney is most susceptible to
influence—as he is viewing this rule to create a plan for addressing an
executive’s possibly ill-advised plan—the prime evokes associations of
protecting the company, which should influence better advice.171
C. Educating Lawyers About Debiasing Techniques

Some have legitimately questioned whether education can
significantly impact behavior that occurs outside of a person’s conscious
169. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.13(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017).
170. Id.
171. Eldred, supra note 55, at 383–84 (explaining that how a decision is framed
can reduce, or increase, “the power of conscious, ethical deliberation”).
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awareness.172 But providing people with the right kind of education and
tools can help them recognize and address their biases.173 How the
education is delivered can make the difference between causing people
to become more entrenched in their biases or open to change. Education
about the existence of biases will likely be ineffective and maybe even
counterproductive, particularly when a person’s biases are “deep-seated
and unconscious.”174 But teaching people productive ways to overcome
their biases may make a difference.175
Research suggests that counter-factual thinking is a method that
can be effective in de-biasing decision-making.176 With this technique,
the decision maker intentionally takes a position inconsistent with the
position that the bias would influence him to reach.177 One strategy for
doing this is considering the “outsider’s perspective” when reaching a
decision on the issue.178
For the corporate advisor, the hazard of partisan bias is an inability
to see why the company’s desired course of conduct may result in
substantial liability.179 A corporation could address this issue by
providing training for its attorneys about how counter-factual thinking
can be used to see the facts from the perspective of a prosecutor or
plaintiff. What arguments would they make if they were to prosecute
172. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 67, at 34–35 (explaining that when
cognitive biases are “deep seated and unconscious, education is least likely
to be effective”); Eldred, supra note 55, at 388 (asserting that “biases
[cannot] be purged simply by educating . . . lawyers about them” and
citing research for the proposition that “merely calling attention to the
existence of unconscious biases and asking people to counteract them
voluntarily rarely changes behavior”).
173. Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with
Implications for the Debates over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37
Harv. J.L. & Gender 185, 228 (2014) (explaining that unconscious bias
does not mean bias that cannot be controlled and explaining the value in
some contexts of describing bias as “unexamined” rather than
“unconscious”).
174. Robertson, supra note 67, at 35.
175. Id. at 34 (citing Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing
Biased Litigants, 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 913, 916 (1997)) (noting the
mixed evidence on the effectiveness of debiasing, but noting that some
studies have found it effective to educate people about biases and ask
them to “question their own judgment by explicitly considering
counteraguments to their own thinking”).
176. Eldred, supra note 55, at 389.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be
Improved?, 4 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 379, 381 (2009)).
179. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
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or file suit based on this decision? In other words, corporate advisors
need to think about the potential for liability when they encounter a
potentially profitable new scheme, rather than focusing on evidence
that confirms the bias that the conduct is acceptable.
D. Serious Consequences for Attorneys Who Fail to Protect Corporate
Clients from Crime and Fraud Liability

Behavioral science suggests that if attorneys were to face serious
consequences for failing to advise against fraudulent and criminal
conduct, those consequences would have a positive impact on future
corporate attorney advice. The “serious consequences” could include
civil and criminal liability. Civil liability would take the form of
malpractice liability for the attorney’s failure to act competently and
loyally to advise against and protect her client from serious forms of
liability.180 Criminal liability would flow from the lawyer’s participation
in the corporate client’s fraudulent scheme.181
While the Timothy Muir case is one in which a corporate attorney
faced serious consequences for his role in a client’s criminal conduct,
such cases remain rare—and not for a lack of attorney misconduct. The
in pari delicto doctrine has generally been interpreted to prevent a
corporate client from pursuing a malpractice claim against an attorney
who failed to advise against criminal or fraudulent misconduct.182
Courts should revisit the liberal application of in pari delicto in these
cases, which effectively insulates corporate attorneys because they failed
to do their job.183 While there are more criminal prosecutions of
corporate lawyers today than in recent history, these prosecutions are
still rare.184 Prosecutors should scrutinize an attorney’s role in a
180. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48 (Am.
Law Inst. 2000) (describing a client’s cause of action against an attorney
for professional negligence). But see Paula Schaefer,
181. Id. at § 8 (describing attorney’s liability for criminal acts).
182. See generally Paula Schaefer, In Pari Delicto Deconstructed: Dismantling
the Doctrine that Protects the Business Entity’s Lawyer from Malpractice
Liability, 90 St. John’s L. Rev. 1003 (2016) (arguing that the in pari
delicto doctrine should not be a complete defense when a corporation
claims that its lawyer committed malpractice by failing to advise against
fraudulent or criminal conduct that harmed the company).
183. Id. at 1062 (explaining that the application of the “in pari delicto defense
depends on a great irony. The facts that should trigger liability for the
lawyer—that the lawyer did not act reasonably to stop insider misconduct
aimed at enriching the [corporate] client—are the basis for the lawyer’s
defense. This is because the in pari delicto doctrine imputes agent conduct
to the [company] . . . . [And] [t]he [company] cannot sue the lawyer
because the lawyer did not do his job.”).
184. It is often noted that none of the lawyers who advised Enron faced
prosecution after the company’s massive accounting fraud became public
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corporation’s fraudulent schemes just as they would consider the
conduct of any other company executive.
One reason an increase in liability for attorneys would likely result
in better advice is that it would prevent ethical fading. Ethical fading
occurs when a person stops thinking of a decision as one that implicates
ethical (and in this case, legal) consequences.185 When a decision instead
is thought of as a business decision or a routine decision that does not
require ethical (or legal) thinking, the decision may not be approached
as thoughtfully.186
An example of how publicity about adverse attorney consequences
can counter ethical fading and lead to better decision-making was
evident following the In re Himmel case. In that case, the Illinois
Supreme Court’s suspended an attorney for failing to report the
unethical conduct of another attorney.187 In the year following Himmel’s
highly publicized suspension, attorney reports of misconduct by fellow
attorneys—as required by Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 8.3—
increased from 154 to 922.188 Put simply, Himmel’s discipline prevented
ethical fading: other attorneys could plainly see the ethical issue that
was implicated by learning of another attorney’s misconduct.
Similarly, publicity about serious consequences that an attorney has
suffered for failing to advise against fraudulent and criminal misconduct
should bring the ethical and legal issue to the forefront of attorneys’
in 2001. Id. at 1049 (first citing Ashby Jones, Where were the Lawyers?,
Wall
St.
J.
(Jan.
2,
2007,
8:52
AM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/02/where-were-the-lawyers/
[https://perma.cc/35YP-Z2RN]; then citing Dan Ackman, Enron’s
Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, Forbes (Jan. 28, 2002, 12:16 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron.html
[https://perma.cc/3KYQ-MVUW]). In more recent years, though, there
have been some high-profile criminal prosecutions of corporate lawyers.
See, e.g., United States v. Newkirk, 684 F. App’x. 95, 96–98 (2d Cir. 2016)
(affirming conviction of Bryan Cave lawyer Harvey Newkirk for his role
in his client’s fraud related to the purchase of Maxim magazine and
holding that the evidence warranted a jury instruction that Newkirk’s
guilty knowledge could be inferred from facts that supported a finding of
conscious avoidance); United States v. Collins, 581 F. App’x. 59, 60–61
(2d Cir. 2014) (affirming conviction of Mayer Brown lawyer Joseph
Collins for his role in Refco, Inc.’s fraudulent scheme and determining
conscious avoidance jury instruction was proper).
185. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of SelfDeception in Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 223, 224–25 (2004).
186. Id. at 232–33.
187. In re James H. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
188. Seth Ellis & Jeffrey R. Hanes, The 20 Year Anniversary of Himmel:
Brushing Up on Your Duty to Report Attorney Misconduct, DCBA, Mar.
2009, at 16.
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minds. Cases like the Muir case—with publicity regarding a corporate
attorney being convicted and sentenced to years in prison189—make a
difference to attorneys in a legal community who follow the coverage.
When there are prominent examples of corporate attorneys doing prison
time, it makes it difficult for lawyers to lose sight of the implications of
their actions. In case there was any doubt, Muir closed a letter to one
reporter with the following: “Last, I have one thing to say: Prison
sucks.”190
Further, holding lawyers responsible for their role in corporate
misconduct addresses one of the situational factors that encourages
wrongful obedience. Individuals are more inclined to be obedient in a
questionable situation when they feel comfortable that the authority
figure is ultimately responsible.191 While there are multiple ways that
laws,192 professional conduct rules,193 and even companies194 might
encourage lawyers to feel responsible for protecting its corporate client
from criminal liability, an attorney’s knowledge that other lawyers have
faced serious consequences for these failures also provides a powerful
incentive. Knowing that jail may be the consequence for failing to take
ownership of the decision is likely to influence attorney advice.
Finally, serious adverse attorney consequences—in the form of civil
or criminal liability—would be significant because it would impact how

189. There has been a good deal of publicity related to Muir’s prosecution and
conviction for his role in his client’s criminal scheme. See, e.g., Dornbrook,
supra note 1; Pete Brush, Atty Tells Jury Tribe Grew Wary of Racer’s
Payday Loan Plan, Law360 (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:47 PM).
190. Dornbrook, supra note 1, at 4.
191. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
192. Burger, supra note 72, at 499 (citing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
requirement that senior executives personally certify the accuracy of
corporate financials as an example of a law that requires a specific person
to take responsibility so that they are less likely to defer to others or pass
blame up or down the corporate hierarchy).
193. The ABA and SEC’s 2003 adoption of attorney professional conduct rules
concerning an attorney’s obligation in the face of organizational client
misconduct was an attempt on the part of both bodies to place clear
responsibility on attorneys to intervene to prevent corporate crime and
fraud. See Carl Pierce et al., Professional Responsibility in the
Life of the Lawyer 596–97 (2d ed, 2015). For reasons discussed in this
Article, those rules should be revised to clarify the attorney’s
responsibility to protect the organizational client from such liability.
194. Burger, supra note 72, at 499 (explaining that in order to lessen wrongful
obedience, organizations should “implement policies that force individuals
[to] take responsibility for their actions”).
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attorney self-interest influences an attorney’s advice.195 Today, it is easy
for an attorney to see her self-interest as aligned with that of the
company’s decision makers (who want to engage in the arguably
fraudulent or criminal conduct) rather than with protecting the
company from liability.196 The attorney can make a good deal of money
“helping” the company engage in misconduct. If it appears there is little
or no chance of facing civil or criminal liability for this help, there is no
incentive for the lawyer to tell corporate decision makers the difficult
news that they do not want to hear. In contrast, if lawyers know that
they can face prison time and/or substantial civil liability for failing to
protect their corporate clients from fraudulent conduct, their selfinterest is realigned with that of their corporate client.

Conclusion
The fact that attorney Timothy Muir is in prison today should be
of concern to corporate attorneys. There is nothing in the facts of his
case that suggests that Muir is a “bad person.” He is just an attorney
who acted in some very predictable ways. It could have happened to
anyone.
Muir acted as a zealous advocate of his corporate client’s plans,
rather than an advisor helping his client avoid liability. He was likely
influenced by his own self-interest in making money and continuing his
working relationship with Scott Tucker’s companies. This would have
made it difficult for Muir to tell Tucker what he did not want to hear.
It is likely that Muir felt obedience and conformity pressure to help the
company continue with business-as-usual, despite the fact that there
were warning signs. Finally, his bias as a partisan for the company
undoubtedly colored his view of the facts, making it difficult to see the
civil and criminal liability that was likely.
Behavioral legal ethics reveals the causes of the flaws in Muir’s
thinking. The field also suggests the tools attorneys, corporations, and
rule makers could use to change corporate attorney behavior that is
potentially harmful to clients. Obedience and conformity research
reveals that competing opinions can result in better decision-making,
while priming studies reveal the way that priming can have a positive
impact on attorney behavior. Research on de-biasing demonstrates that
attorneys can learn to overcome (or at least lessen) their biases so they
will be more likely to reach an independent professional judgment. And
while it is certainly not a popular solution, if more corporate attorneys
were facing serious consequences for facilitating fraudulent and criminal
195. Eldred, supra note 55, at 388 (explaining that a direct strategy for
addressing ethical blindness in attorneys is to change the way they
calculate self-interest).
196. See supra Part II.D.
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conduct, then that would have a positive impact on the self-interest
and obedience “calculations” of other attorneys navigating these issues.
The list of possible solutions provided in this Article is just a
starting point. Relying upon behavioral legal ethics, that list can be
expanded upon by creative stakeholders interested in the goal of
attorneys providing better advice to their corporate clients.
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